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TORT CLAIMS UNDER THE PRESENT
AND PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACTS

Ideally, the victim of a tort should receive compensation for a valid
claim once a judgment is entered against the tortfeasor. Unfortunately,
this will not happen if the tortfeasor is insolvent and uninsured or becomes so before the claim can be collected. In such cases the tort
claimant may be confronted with the bankruptcy process as the only
means of redress. Participation in this process can be frustrating, however, because of the increased expense and delay and the well-known fact
that claimants participating in bankruptcy rarely receive more than a
small fraction of their claim. 1
Unlike the many commercial business claimants who must deal with
bankrupt clients, tort victims have no way of reducing the probability that
they will have to contend with this process. Commercial business practices can be altered to reduce the likelihood of dealing with potential
bankrupts, but the tort victim has no such opportunity with respect to
potential tortfeasors. Although this difference between tort claims and
commercial claims argues for equal if not preferential treatment of tort
claimants in bankruptcy, such has not been the case. The bankruptcy
process has traditionally concerned itself almost exclusively with commercial claims; what little recognition there has been of claims ex delicto
has come slowly .2
Congress may soon enact the first complete revision of the United
States bankruptcy laws in almost four decades. Among the numerous
changes proposed by the legislature is a major alteration of the provability
and dischargeability of tort claims asserted against the bankrupt's estate. 3
This article will discuss the treatment of tort claims in the present Act and

1
In the latest year for which figures are available, 1974, the total percentage of liabilities
paid in cases in which there were more than nominal assets (i.e., those cases in which
administrative expenses did not exhaust the estate in bankruptcy) was 9.4 percent. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table 6 (1974)[hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE TABLES]. Even more sobering is
the fact that 77.1 percent of the 152,500 straight bankruptcy cases filed in 1974 were nominal
or no-asset cases. Id. at Table 4A.
2
See Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920).
3
There are two proposed acts: H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) and S. 2266, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (19n). The portions of the Acts that are relevant to the present discussion,
however, are almost identical. In the few areas where there are significant differences
between the two bills, the differences will be noted.
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the changes to be made by the proposed Act, and will evaluate alternative
approaches to compensating victims of bankrupt tortfeasors.

I.

PRESENT

&

PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR RECOVERY

OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST BANKRUPTS

A. Straight Bankruptcy
1. The Present Act-The overwhelming majority of petitions under the
Bankruptcy Act are filed in straight bankruptcy. 4 The process may be
initiated voluntarily by the filing of a petition by the debtor, or it may be
initiated by a petition from creditors, in which case it is considered
involuntary. 5 In straight bankruptcy all of an insolvent debtor's
nonexempt property is collected, liquidated, and distributed to participating creditors holding provable claims against the bankrupt. 6 In order to
participate in the distribution, a creditor must meet three requirements:
he must have a provable claim, 7 timely file a proper proof of claim, 8 and
have his claim allowed. 9 After the estate is distributed, the debtor is
discharged from all provable debts, 10 unless creditors raise objections to
discharge under section 14c 11 or exceptions to discharge under section
17a.1 2

Provability is strictly defined in section 63 of the Act, which enumerates the categories of claims that may be proved. 13 The first category of
provable claims that may encompass a tort claim is described in section
63a(l): debts founded upon a "fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment

• For the past ten years for which figures are available, straight bankruptcies have
occupied the following percentages of petitions filed:
1965 83.8%
1970 83.6%
1966 84.7%
1971 83.6%
1%7 84.1%
1972 84.2%.
1968 83. 7%
1973 84.2%
1969 83.8%
1974 83.4%
These percentages are based on the statistics in ADMINISTRATIVE TABLES, supra note I. In
fact, according to a Brookings Institution study, in the area of business bankruptcies, nine
out of ten bankrupts file in straight bankruptcy. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 120 (1971)[hereinafter cited as BROOKINGS].
5
Bankruptcy Act § 3, II U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
6
The provisions pertaining to straight bankruptcy in the present Act are Bankruptcy Act
§§ 1-72, II U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1970).
7 Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(14), 63a, II U.S.C. §§ 1(14), 103(a) (1970).
8
Bankruptcy Act§ 57, II U.S.C. § 93 (1970).
9 Bankruptcy Act§ 57d, II U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970).
10
Bankruptcy Act § 17a, II U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
11
Bankruptcy Act § 14c, II U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970).
12
Bankruptcy Act § 17d, II U.S.C. § 35(d) (1970).
13
Bankruptcy Act§ 63a, II U .S.C. § 103(a) (1970). This section is exclusive; claims not
falling within the categories set out in § 63a may not participate in any phase of bankruptcy.
Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920); Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp., 188 F. Supp.
530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); In re Shawsheen Dairy Inc., 47 F. Supp. 494 (D. Mass. 1942). They
may not even be set off against claims of the bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 68b, 11 U .S.C. §
108(b) (1970).
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or an instrument in writing" 14 The obligation need not be immediately
due, but it must be "absolutely owing" 15 and therefore cannot be based
on ajudgment that is being appealed. 16 Although tort claims may come
within this category, the category was not intended to provide significant
recognition of the tort claimant as an eligible participant in the bankruptcy
distribution. 17 It is "the element of merger in judgment that gives the
claim a standing independent of its tortious origin. " 18 The only major
concession to the admission of tort claims into the bankruptcy process is
that the court will not look behind the judgment to determine the nature of
the claim. 19 Some authority exists for the proposition that a tort claim
evidenced by an instrument in writing should constitute a provable claim,
not because it stands as a liquidated representation of the tort liability, but
because the writing is itself a contractual obligation having as its consideration the moral duty to make the victim whole. 20
The second major category that may cover a tort claim also reflects the
view that bankruptcy is primarily designed to deal with commercial contractual obligations. Section 63a( 4) permits debts founded upon "express
or implied" contracts to be proved. 21 Inclusion of implied contracts is, of
course, necessary to encompass all commercial creditors, but this also
introduces many noncontractual claims. The tort claimant can qualify by
waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit in an appropriate case. 22 Judgments based on claims of conversion, 23 fraudulent representation, 24 or
14
Bankruptcy Act§ 63a(l), 11 U.S.C. § l03(a)(l) (1970). See Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S.
467 (1925).
10 Bankruptcy Act § 63(a)(I), 11 U .S.C. § I03(a)(I) (1970).
16 Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Hanson, 44 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932) (pendancy
on appeal deprives a judgment of finality in bankruptcy). See also Marotta v. American
Surety Co., 57 F.2d 829 (!st Cir. 1932) (a verdict alone is not sufficient to constitute a
judgment); In re Kroger Bros. Co., 262 F. 463 (E.D. Wis. 1920) (judgment that was rendered
in bankrupt's favor before bankruptcy but reversed on appeal not provable).
17
See In re Crescent Lumber, 154 F. 724 (S.D. Ala. 1907).
18
3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,I 63.25[2].
19
This principle became generally accepted only after its recognition by the Supreme
Court. Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925). Prior to this, those opposing proof of
judgments based on tort claims could rely on the Supreme Court's statement in Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 72 (1904): "The mere fact that ajudgment has been rendered does not
prevent the court from looking into the proceedings with a view of determining the nature of
the liability which has been reduced to judgment," citing Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457
(1887). In expressly rejecting application of this language to judgments based on tort claims
the Supreme Court distinguished the Markoe case by pointing out that the"decision rested
on the peculiar and exceptional nature of a decree for alimony." Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S.
at 470.
20
3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 63.25[2]. A similar category of provable debts is the
class of claims made provable by section 63a(6): "an award of an industrial-accident
commission, body, or officer of any State having jurisdiction to make awards of workmen's
compensation in case of injury or death from injury, if such injury occurred prior to
adjudication." Bankruptcy Act§ 63a(6), 11 U.S.C. § l03(a)(6) (1970).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4), 11 U .S.C. § l03(a)(4) (1970).
22 Friend v. Talcott, 288 U.S. 27 (1913); Quirk v. Smith, 168 N.E. 174 (1929); cf. In re
Paramount Publix Corp., 8 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). Courts will sometimes go to great
lengths to find a contractual relationship. See, e.g., Dixon v. Kantor, 165 Misc. 315, 299
N.Y.S. 507 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937):
23
This is usually styled as an action in trover. See Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915);
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176 (1904).
•• Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913).
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patent infringement25 may be considered implied contracts under this
theory. The courts have been reluctant to extend this category, though,
and the tort claimant attempting to rely on an implied contract to avoid
the restrictions on proving tort claims in bankruptcy will find strict limitations in the classification of ·implied contracts. 26
Section 63a(5) admits to proof "provable debts reduced to judgments
after the filing of the petition and before the consideration of the bankrupt's ... discharge. " 27 However, the independent application of this section appears to be extremely limited. Indeed, the section may be coextensive with other subsections because any debt falling into this category
must already be "provable" at the time of the filing of the petition. 28
The only real recognition of tort claimants is found in section 63a(7),
which makes provable any debt founded upon "the right to recover
damages in any action for negligence instituted prior to and pending at the
time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. " 29 This section does not,
however, allow provability of claims for intentional torts that have not
been reduced to judgment or settlement. 30 These claims were not included because the legislature was instead concerned with the overwhelming number of tort claims arising out of the negligent operation of
automobiles. 31 The requirement that the claim be "pending at the time of
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy" has been strictly construed. Thus,
a claim for negligence will not be deemed provable if the negligence action
has been discontinued for any reason prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. 32
25 There is some conflict in this area. See Schiff v. Hammond Clock Co., 69 F.2d 742 (7th
Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 293 U.S. 529 (1934) (provable); Goldsmith v. Overseas
Scientific Corp., 188 F. Supp. 530(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (nonprovable). Cf. Haynes Stellite Co. v.
Chesterfield, 97 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1938).
26
See Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (failure to exercise reasonable
care in management ofa bank is not sufficient); Brown & Adams v. United Button, 149 F. 48
(3d Cir. 1906) (injury to goods is not sufficient); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 8 F. Supp.
644 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); In re Crescent Lumber, 154 F. 724 (S.D. Ala. 1907) (employment
relationship with the bankrupt is not sufficient); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 230 So.2d
433 (La. App. 1969) (subrogation contract in favor of insurance company is not sufficient);
Winfree v. Jones, 104 Va. 39, 51 S.E. 153 (1905) (claim against lessee for negligent damages
to premises not sufficient). Cf. Poznanovic v. Gilardine, 174 Minn. 89, 218 N.W. 244 (1928)
(promise to repair negligently caused damage to property is sufficient).
27
Bankruptcy Act § 63a(5), II U.S.C. § 103(a)(5) (1970).
28
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 7.05[2. l] note 12.
29
Bankruptcy Act§ 63a(7), II U.S.C. § 103(a)(7) (1970). This concession to tort claimants
came slowly. It was not until 1934 that negligence claims were made provable. Act of June 7,
1934, 48 Stat. 911. Even then, there still had to be a judgment before the bankruptcy order
was entered. Act of May 27, 1926. In re Gellman, 13 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Jones v.
Fiesel, 204 Minn. 333, 283 N.W. 535 (1939). See 78 CONG. REc. 9549. The Chandler Act
eliminatedthis requirement in 1938. In re Cohen, 25 F. Supp. 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
30
3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 63.29 note 11; MACLACHLAN ON BANKRUPTCY § 113
(1956) [hereinafter cited as MACLACHLAN]. There is only one other category which might
make a tort claim provable: § 63a(8), which makes "contingent debts" provable. Bankruptcy Act§ 63a(8), II U.S.C. § 103(a)(8) (1970). The courts have not adopted this view,
though, and "have uniformly limited section 63a(8) to debts originating from contract." D.
EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS 250 (1973); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 230
So.2d 433 (La. App. 1969). See In re Hutchcraft, 247 F. 187 (E.D. Ky. 1917).
31
MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at§ 138.
32
In re Coutee, 460 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Once a claim is deemed provable, the Claimant must file a proof of claim
in accordance with the procedures set out in section 57. 33 The difference
between a provable claim and a proof of claim is that the former refers to
the nature of the claim while the latter refers to the procedure for participating in the bankruptcy distribution. These procedures do not raise
any particular difficulties with respect to tort claims and will not be
examined here.
Although a claim is provable and proper proof of claim has been filed, it
cannot share in the distribution unless it has been "allowed." Section 57d
provides that claims having been proved and presented to the court "shall
be allowed," unless some objection is raised. 34 There is an important
proviso, however, in section 57d: any unliquidated or contingent claim
will not be allowed unless the claim can be liquidated or the amount
estimated within a period that would not "unduly delay" administration
of the estate. 35 Liquidation may take place in a state court, in a federal
court in an appropriate case, or in the bankruptcy court. If an unliquidated or contingent claim has been proved but is disallowed under section
57d, section 63d 36 deems it nonprovable even though it would have fit into
one of the categories in section 63a. 37
The discharge of the debtor in bankruptcy 38 releases him from all
provable debts, except those that are made expressly nondischargeable
by the Bankruptcy Act. 39 Thus, the tort creditor permitted to share with
the commercial creditors in the distribution of the debtor's assets is faced
with the quid pro quo of having his claim extinguished, probably in return
for a tiny percentage of its actual value if he receives anything at all. 40 In
contrast, holders of nonprovable claims, including those disallowed under
section 57 and made nonprovable by section 67d may not participate in

33
Bankruptcy Act§ 57d, 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970). See Bankruptcy Rule 306(b), General
Order 21, and General Forms 28.31.
34
Bankruptcy Rule 306(b).
35
Inclusion in the Bankruptcy Act of provisions for the liquidiation of claims, including
those of tortious origin, does not make tort claims provable in bankruptcy. Schall v.
Camors, 251 U.S. 239 (1920); Brown & Adams v. United Button, 149 F. 48 (3d Cir. 1906).
36 Bankruptcy Act § 63d, 11 U.S.C. § I03(d) (1970).
37
"Where any contingent or unliquidated claim has been proved, but, as provided in
subsection d of section 57 of this Act, has not been allowed, such claim shall not be deemed
provable under this Act." Bankruptcy Act§ 63d, II U.S.C. § 103(d) (1970). See note 34
supra. Allowance is not a condition precedent to proof. Haynes Stellite Co. v. Chesterfield,
97 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 1938). The claim is proved and then, failing liquidation, it is made
nonprovable. In re Hornstein, 122 F. 266 (N.D.N.Y. 1903); St. Paul - Mercury Indemnity
Co. v. Dale, 20 S.D. 137, 15 N.W.2d 577 (1944).
38
An individual is automatically discharged following his or her adjudication in bankruptcy. There is no formal application procedure. Bankruptcy Rule 404. Unless the bankrupt
waives discharge, the discharge is gained after the expiration of the time fixed for filing an
objection to discharge. Id.
39
Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(15), 17a, 11 U .S.C. §§ 1(15), 35(a) (1970).
40
See MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at § 138.
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the distribution, 41 but they are not affected by the discharge 42 and may
later collect their claims.
As an additional measure of protection for some classes of creditors,
section 17a enumerates claims that are excepted from discharge and
therefore remain enforceable against the debtor after completion of the
proceedings. 43 The classes of provable debts and nondischargeable debts
are not mutually exclusive. 44 Neither nonprovability of the claim45 nor
participation in the bankruptcy distribution46 bars the claimant from later
asserting nondischargeability if the claim is covered by one of the exceptions in section 17a.
The cumulative effect of several provisions of section 17a is to except
from discharge almost all provable intentional tort claims. Section 17a(2)
41
A contrary case would seem to beln re Nething, 137 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1954). In an
earlier bankruptcy proceeding the bankruptcy court held that a release given by a person
with whom the bankrupt was alleged to have been ajoint-tortfeasor served also to release
the bankrupt. In a subsequent proceeding the claimants sought reform of the release. The
court held that it was bound by the bankruptcy court's determination: " the claims, although
not allowable while the original release was in effect, were at the same time provable claims
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act,'' and were therefore discharged by the previous
adjudication. Id. at 97. See Shapiro v. Lubasch, 58 N.Y.S.2d 695, 186 Misc. 182 (1945).
Nething would appear to be in conflict with Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445
(1936), which held that a discharge does not release a claim which was not provable because
it was uncertain and hence not allowable. See also Lesser v. Gray, 236 U.S. 70 (1914). The
apparent conflict may be resolved by considering Hagardine-McKittrick Goods Co. v.
Hudson, 122 F. 232 (8th Cir. 1903), where the court states that an otherwise provable debt
which is disallowed becomes dischargeable only if it has been disallowed because of a valid
defense (a "plea at bar") to the claim, rather than because of a mere contingency or
difficulty in liquidation. That is to say, a provable disallowed claim is discharged if it is
disallowed for reasons other than those set out in § 57d. See Bankruptcy Act § 63d, 11
u.s.c. § 103(d) (1970).
42
The language of§ I 7a implies that, in order to be excepted from discharge, the liabilities
must be provable: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable
debts." Bankruptcy Act § 17a, II U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970) (emphasis added). However, the
creditor need not prove his claim before asserting nondischargeability. In re Warnack, 239
F. 779 (W.D. Tenn. 1917). Conversely, if the claim is not provable, it would fit within the
statutory language and judicial interpretation which directs that nonprovable debts, including those which are nonprovable as a result of being disallowed, are not discharged and
survive. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
43
Bankruptcy Act § 17a, II U.S.C. § 35a (1970).
44
Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913).
45
See DeRoberts v. Crimmins, 406 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Goldsmith v. Overseas
Scientific Corp., 188 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Covington,
14 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). In Crimmins the court reasoned that "although the
lists in Sections 17a and 63a were intended to be mutually exclusive, the latter listing the
types of claims that are dischargeable, and the former listing the types that are not, the
wording of Section 17a makes it clearly dominant: even if one of the types of claims listed in
Section 17a may be a 'provable debt' it is nevertheless exempt from discharge." DeRoberts
v. Crimmins, 406 F. Supp. at 285.
46
See Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913). The Supreme Court explained the relationship between §§ 17a and 63a in the following manner:
"It is apparent that the exemptions do not rest upon any theory of the exclusion
of the creditor for the bankruptcy act, or of deprivation of right to participate in the
distribution, but solely on the ground that, although such rights are enjoyed, an
exemption from the effect of the discharge is superadded. The text leaves no room
for any other view, since the exceptions in terms are accorded to certain classes of
debts which are provable under § 63, and therefore debts which are entitled to
participate in the distribution .... "
Id. at 39.
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excepts from discharge provable claims for money or property obtained
by false representations, including false statements made in a credit
application; it also excepts provable claims based on "willful and malicious conversion of ... property." This second half of section 17a(2)
closely parallels section l 7a(8), 47 which excepts provable claims for willful and malicious injuries to person or property .48 Most courts have
interpreted "willful and malicious" to mean merely intentional, 49 thus
giving these two subsections coextensive application to almost all provable intentional tort claims. These exceptions may be narrowly construed
though because they are in derogation of the debtor's remedy. 50 In conformity with this view, at least one court has interpreted section l 7c as
requiring that the right to an exception be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. 51
Section 64a of the present Act52 sets out certain categories of claims
which are to be paid before any other claims. As a consequence, these
priority claims receive a considerably higher percentage of the face
amount of the liabilities than general claims. 53 These claims, in order of
payment, are administrative expenses, wages not exceeding $600 and
earned within three months, certain expenses claimed in connection with
obtaining conviction of a bankrupt or revocation of an earlier discharge,
taxes, and debts given priority by the laws of the United States or given
priority by a State law applying to rental claims. 54 The only category
which may apply to a tort victim is administrative expenses. Judgment for
a tort committed by the trustee or his representative in the process of

47
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(8), ll U.S.C. § 35(a)(8) (1970). Clause (8) was, in fact, part of
clause (2) prior to the amendment in 1970 of§ 17a by Public Law 91-467, § 6. Until that
amendment, clause (2) contained no reference to conversion of the property of another.
48 Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), ll U.S.C. 35(a)(2) (1970).
49
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). This has been extended to "wanton and
reckless" negligence, id; United States v. Reed, 86 F. 308 (2d Cir. 1898); In re Dutkiewicz,
27 F.2d 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1928); McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N.W.2d 153 (1949).
50
IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 17.17. See notes 185-88 and accompanying text infra
for a discussion of the fresh start concept.
51 Bankruptcy Act§ 17c, II U.S.C. § 35c (1970); DeRoberts v. Crimmins, 406 F. Supp.
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Section 17c(2) established the procedure for a claimant seeking
dischargeability. The procedures for the exemptions in clauses 17a(2) and (8) as well as for
clause (4), are different than those for the other exemptions. A debt within clause (2) will be
discharged unless formal proof is made within a period of time prescribed by the court, but
no application need be filed for a debt excepted by clause (8) if a right to trial by
jury exists and any party to a pending action on such debt has timely demanded a
trial by jury or if either the bankrupt or a creditor submits a signed statement of an
intention to do so.
Bankruptcy Act§ 17c, II U.S.C. § 35(c) (1970). See Bankruptcy Rule 409(a)(2). Otherwise,
a claimant under clause (8) must also file an application. Id.
52 Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. 104(a) (1970). See also, Bankruptcy Act §§ 337(2),
381, 659(6), ll u.s.c. §§ 737(2), 781, 1059(6) (1970).
53
In the fiscal years beginning in 1965 and ending in 1969, the average return to a priority
creditor in an asset case was 35.5 percent of the claim while the return to the general
creditor was only 7 percent. In 1974 and 1975, the last years for which figures are available
the return to priority creditors was, respectively 35 percent and 29.6 percent; for general
creditors it was 4.1 percent and 6.5 percent. ADMININSTRA TIVE TABLES, supra note l.
•• Bankruptcy Act § 64a, ll U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
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operating the debtor's business 55 or maintaining the debtor's property
during the administration of the case constitute administrative expenses. 56
Fully secured creditors are given a form of overriding priority in the
sense that their collateral is not subject to the claims of the other creditors
in bankruptcy, although they must participate as general creditors to the
extent their claims exceed the value of the security. 57 Nondischarge is
another form of quasi-priority.
2. The Proposed Act-The drafters of the proposed Act have been
unanimous in their rejection of the present Act's Byzantine structure for
satisfying claims against the estate. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, the current
versions of the proposed Acts and the ones most likely to control in this
area, define "claim" very broadly, as a "right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 58 The Committee Report for the House bill describes this definition as an explicit rejection of the concept of provability
used in the present Act. 59
55

See Bankruptcy Act§ 2a(5), 11 U.S.C. ll(a)(5)(1970); Bankruptcy Rules 201(a) and

216.
56 Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968). The cost of insuring against tort claims arising
during administration is also deductible. Id.
57 Bankruptcy Act § 57e, 11 U .S.C. § 93e (1970). The value of the security is determined
by the court pursuant to § 57h. Bankruptcy Act § 57h, 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1970).
The irony of this form of priority was noted by Professor Schuchman:
Those creditors with the economic leverage to obtain collateral by means of some
legally effective security device are, on the whole, not subject to the drastic
adjustments of their debts which befall unsecured creditors. As a result, the
discharge of personal liability is usually of less significance to larger creditors and
others able to obtain collateral which can be reclaimed from the bankrupt estate
and privately liquidated to pay the debt . . . . It seems an unlikely contention that
secured creditors get far greater rights and hence receive more money from bankrupt estates because they are more deserving or because their debts are more
worthy.
Schuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403, 424, 445
(1973).
58
H.R. 8200 § 101(4)(A), S. 2266 § !01(4)(A). The predecessor of the House bill, H.R. 6,
contained the same language except the adjective ''undisputed.'' This word was added in the
mark-up of the Bill and gives even greater emphasis to the comprehensive nature of the
definition. Note too that, unlike the present Act, the proposed Acts do not restrict their
definition of "claim" to monetary obligations: "claim" also includes a "right to an equitable
remedy for breach of performance if such breach does not give rise to a right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, or undisputed, secured or unsecured."
59 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., !st Sess. 180 (1977). The authors of the report give the
following rather terse explanation for using this definition:
Under the liquidation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, certain creditors are not
permitted to share in the estate because of the nonprovable nature of their claims,
and the debtor is not discharged for those claims. Thus, the relief for the debtor is
incomplete, and those creditors are not given an opportunity to collect in the case
on their claims. The proposed law will permit a complete settlement of the affairs of
the bankrupt debtor, and a complete discharge and fresh start.
Id. The original proposal for reform of the bankruptcy laws was prepared by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Public Law 91-354. This
group of bankruptcy experts also rejected the concept of provability. Although it is considerably less specific, their definition of "claim" was intended to be equally broad as that in
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Section 502 allows all claims for which proofs of claim have been filed
by the creditors 60 or, in some cases, by the debtor, 61 the trustee, 62 or
other interested parties. 63 As under the present Bankruptcy Rule 306,
allowance is conditioned on the failure of a "party in interest" 64 to
object65 on the basis of certain exceptions, 66 but none of these exceptions
applies to tort claims. 67 Section 502(c) makes it clear that claims that are
unliquidated may still be allowable. Unlike the current proviso to section
57d, which disallows certain unliquidated and contingent claims, section
502(c) of the proposed Act requires that such claims be "estimated. " 68
Nothing in the Act itself indicates how the claims are to be "estimated,"
but the House Committee Report suggests that this is one of the "matters
that will be dealt with by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or by local
rules of the Court. " 69 Consequently, the difficult problem of how disputed, unliquidated tort claims are to be reduced to a dollar amount
remains unresolved. Nevertheless, the thrust of the new Act is to make all
claims allowable by having the court estimate their proper amount where
the claims are not subject to prompt liquidation.
Although there is no definitional section for "discharge," the term is
used in the proposed Act 70 and its effect is described in section 524. That
section voids all judgments representing liabilities for claims arising before commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings (unless, of course, it
the bills presently before Congress. " 'Claim' means legally enforceable demand for performance of an obligation to pay money." H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., Isl Sess. I
(1973). They later commented that, under their proposal,
the concept and language of "provability" found in § 63a and other sections of the
present Act have been eliminated. All claims, including intentional tort claims and
others not provable under § 63a, are recognized by this section. The definitions of
"debt" and "creditor" in § 1-102 of the proposed Act have been broadened
accordingly.
ii. at IOI. See also id. at 6, 7.
60
Section 50I(a) established a creditor's right to file a claim.
61 After the passage of the proposed Act, "bankrupts" will no longer exist. The "bankrupt" has been rechristened the "debtor." H.R. 8200 § 101(12), S. 2266 § 101(13).
62 The debtor and the trustee receive their authority to file proofs of claims from§ 50l(c):
"In a case under chapter 7 or 13 of this title, if a creditor does not timely file a proof of such
creditor's claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of such claim."
63
Section 50l(b) provides, "[i]f a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor's
claim, an entity that is liable to such creditor with the debtor, or that has secured such
creditor, may file a proof of such claim with the court."
64
"Party in interest" is not defined in the bills, but a negative definition might be inferred
from the definition of a "disinterested person" in H.R. 8200 § 101(13) and S. 2266 § 101(14),
both of which provide for only very limited exceptions.
65
H.R. 8200 § 502(a) provides, "[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section
501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest objects." S. 2266 also gives a
right to object to "a creditor of a partner in a partnership that is a debtor under Chapter 7" in
the same section.
66
Section 502(b).
67
See § 502(b)(l)-(9).
68
Section 502(c) provides: "Any contingent or unliquidated claim, liquidation of which
would unduly delay the closing of the case, or any claim for which applicable law provides
only an equitable remedy, shall be estimated for the purpose of allowance under this
section." See H.R REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, !st Sess. 354 (1977).
69
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, !st Sess. 239, 296 (1977).
10
See§§ 523, 727. The Act proposed by tl)e bankruptcy commission did include such a
definition. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong, !st Sess. 2 (1973).
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arises out of a liability excepted from discharge) 71 and enjoins actions
against the debtor for the collection of such debts. 72 In a proceeding in
straight bankruptcy, or liquidation as it is called in the proposed Act, 73 the
discharge relieves the debtor from all unexcepted debts arising before the
order for relief. 74 As in the current Act, such debts are not excepted from
discharge merely because no proof of claim was filed or the claim was
disallowed. 75 The debts are excepted, though, if they fall within the
categories of debts excepted from discharge by paragraphs (2), (4), or (6)
of section 523(a) 76 and were not listed by the debtor in his schedule of
assets and liabilities as required by section 521(1) "in time to permit ...
timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of
dischargeability of such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless [the]
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely
filing and request. " 77
The exceptions to discharge enumerated in section 523 closely follow
those set out in section 17 of the present Act. 78 In recognition of the
irrelevance of an exception to the discharge of a corporation, 79 section
523 applies only to individual debtors, in contrast to present section 17a
which applies to all "bankrupts." Also, because the concept of provability has been abandoned, the restriction of the discharge to "provable
debts" has been eliminated.
Section 523(a)(2) excepts from discharge claims based on false pretenses in nearly the same circumstances as section 17a(2) of the present
Act, although it adds significant qualifications. Section 523(a)(4), corresponding to section 17a(4) of the present Act, excepts from discharge
claims "for embezzlement or larceny. " 80 Section 17a(4) is considerably
more elaborate, covering liabilities "created by [the debtor's] fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer
or in any fiduciary capacity." The exception for claims based on "fraud"
has been moved to section 523(a)(2) and the limiting phrase "while acting
as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity" has been eliminated because of
its uncertain scope. 81 The terms "misappropriation" and "defalcation"

71

Section 524(a)(I).
Section 524(a)(2).
73
The general provisions of chapters I, 3 and 5 of the proposed act are made applicable to
proceedings in liquidation by section 103.
74
Section 727(b).
72

15
76

Jd.

Such debts may include tort claims. For a detailed discussion of paragraphs 523 (a)(2),
(4), and (6), see notes 78-89 and accompanying text infra.
77
Section 523(a)(3)(B).
78
See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., tst Sess. 129 (1977).
79
See text accompanying footnotes 182-84 infra.
80
The official comments to § 4-506(a)(5) of the Act proposed by the Commission on
Bankruptcy, which is identical to proposed§ 523(a)(4), state that "[t]he standard of 'fraud' is
moved to a more appropriate location in clause (2)." Clause (2) is similar to§ 523(a)(2). H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1973).
81
See id. at 139; cf. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 17.24, at 1707-14.t (1971); Countryman, The New Dischargeability Laws, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1-57 (1975).
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have been discarded as "overbroad and uncertain in meaning, " 82 and
"larceny" was substituted because it is amenable to precise definition. 83
The Committee Report accompanying H.R. 8200 states that section 523
was intended to include liability for conversion where the debtor intends
to borrow property for a short period of time with no intent to inflict
injury but does in fact inflict injury. 84
Section 523(a)(6), 85 the counterpart to section 17a(8) of the present Act,
excepts from discharge any debt for ''willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another person or to the property of another person. " 86 The
Committee Report on H.R. 8200 raises doubts whether the drafters intended to include section 17a(2) claims for willful conversion in section
523(a)(6) or in section 523(a)(4). In any event, such claims are clearly
excepted from the discharge and the present interpretation of' 'willful and
malicious" as meaning deliberate or intentional is intended to be continued under the proposed Act. 87
. Debts otherwise excepted from discharge by paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of
section 523(a) are discharged unless the creditor holding such a claim
requests a hearing after notice by the court. 88 The only exception to this
rule is where the debtor fails to list the tort claim in his schedule of
liabilities under section 521. 89
The proposed Act continues the present pattern of priority, but increases the number of categories of claims from five to six. 90 After the
satisfaction of all secured claims, administrative expenses retain first
priority, and include certain expenses that are now accorded third priority. Where the petition against the debtor is involuntary, claims arising in
the ordinary course of business before appointment of a trustee or issuance of an order for relief are given second priority. Wages are still
given priority and the allowable amount is increased to $1,800; claims for
contributions to employee benefit plans are given priority; taxes are
granted priority in most cases; and there is a new priority granted to
deposits made in connection with the purchase or rental of consumer
goods by an individual creditor. 91 Again, tort claims are given no explicit
recognition.

82

H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong, lst Sess. 139 (1973): See Central Hanover Bank

& Trust Co. v. Herbst, 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937).
83

H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong, lst Sess. 139 (1973).
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 364 (1977).
8
" Section 523(a)(5) in S. 2266. Cf. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., lst Sess. 139-40
(1973).
86
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 364 (1977).
87
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 365 (1977). "To the extent that Tinker v.
Colwell, 139 U.S. 473 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that
other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled." Id. See note 49 supra.
88
Section 523(c). In such a hearing, the court must determine whether the debt is indeed
excepted from discharge by paragraph (2), (4), or (6). Id.
89 See also § 523(a)(3)(B).
90
Section 507. This section is specifically made applicable to reorganizations (§
1123(a)(l)) and wage earners' plans (§ l322(a)(2)).
91
Section 507.
84
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B. Reorganization and Arrangements 92
1. Reorganization under the Present Act-Chapter X of the present
Act 93 provides for the reorganization of corporate debtors. 94 Far fewer
cases arise under reorganization than under straight bankrupty. 95 A chapter X case may be initiated by the debtor, by three or more creditors with
liquidated, non-contingent claims aggregating at least $5,000, or by an
indenture trustee. 96 Once the reorganization procedure begins, a trustee
is appointed by the bankruptcy court. 97 The trustee has a duty to prepare
and file a plan of reorganization and, if requested by the court, to conduct
an investigation of the corporation's financial affairs. 98 The plan may
affect the interests of general creditors, as well as of stockholders and
secured creditors. 99 The ability of the plan to affect the rights of secured
creditors may be only "nominal" 100 as a result of the requirement that the
plan be accepted by "creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the claims
filed and allowed of each class. " 101 In addition to receiving creditor
acceptance, the plan must also be confirmed by the court. 102 To confirm,
the court must conclude inter alia that the plan is "fair and equitable," 103
which has been construed to mean that each class of claims must be paid
in full before a claim of a lesser class is compensated. 104 These plans are
seldom successful. 105
Section 102 makes the straight bankrupty provisions found in Chapters
I to VI1 106 applicable to proceedings in reorganization "insofar as they are

92 "Arrangement" is technically an anachronism. It does not appear in the present
Bankruptcy Rules.
93 Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, ll U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
94 Bankruptcy Act§ 106(5), 11 U.S.C. § 506(5) (1970). Reorganization under Chapter Xis
a child of the equity receivership. MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at 373; H. 0LECK, DEBTOR
AND CREDITOR LAW 323 (1953).
95
For example, during the period beginning with fiscal yeai- 1960 and ending with fiscal
year 1965, the number of Chapter X cases never reached even .2 percent of the number of
straight bankruptcy cases. ADMINISTRATIVE TABLES (1965), supra note l, at 5.
96 Bankruptcy Act § 126, 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
97
Bankruptcy Act§ 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970). If the indebtedness is less than $250,000
the appointment is a matter of discretion. Id. The Bankruptcy Rules authorize the court to
allow the debtor to remain in possession to conduct the business. Bankruptcy Rule 10-207.
98 Bankruptcy Act § 167, 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1970).
99 Bankruptcy Act § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
100
MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at 374.
101
Bankruptcy Act § 179, 11 U .S.C. § 579 (1970). Classes of creditors in which two-thirds
of the creditors have not accepted the plan are covered by Bankruptcy Act § 216(7), 11
U.S.C. § 616(7) (1970). See also Bankruptcy Rule 10-305.
102
Bankruptcy Act § 221, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
1oa Id.
104
This is the so-called "absolute priority" rule. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642
(1947); RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946); Group of Institutional Investors
v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106
(1939); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
10 • Only about one-quarter of the period from fiscal year 1964 to fiscal year 1968 were
successful. BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 145. See ADMINISTRATIVE TABLES, supra note 1, at
Table F4b.
106
Bankruptcy Act§§ 1-72, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-112 (1970).
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not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of [Chapter X]. " 107 One
major departure from straight bankruptcy procedure is the definition in
section 106( 1) 108 of "claims" for the purposes of reorganization. That
section explicitly rejects the concept of provability established in section
63 and allows all claims, "whether secured or unsecured, liquidated or
unliquidated, fixed or contingent. " 109 The broad admissibility of claims in
reorganization is extended still further in section 201, which provides that
claims need only arise before the qualification of a rece~ver or trustee to
be provable. Tort claims of all types arising before the qualification of the
receiver or trustee are thus provable against the estate in reorganization.
There are no exceptions to discharge in reorganization, and all creditors
are bound by the disposition of property under the plan, regardless of
whether they filed proofs of their claims or whether their claims were
scheduled or allowable.11° Provision may be made, however, in the plan
or in the order confirming the plan for the exception of particular claims
from the discharge .111
The marked differences between the allowability and provability provisions under reorganization and those under straight bankruptcy are due to
the different purposes behind the two procedures. Unlike straight bankruptcy, which has as its goal the "expeditious liquidation and distribution
of the debtor's assets, " 112 the goal of reorganization is "preservation of
going concern values and the rehabilitation of the debtor or the transfer of
its property to a successor to carry on the business. " 113 In order to
accomplish its goals, the straight bankruptcy process omits certain claims
that are not capable of prompt liquidation, while the reorganization process makes all debts provable.
2. Arrangements 114 under the Present Act-Section 306(1) of Chapter
XI states that " 'arrangement' shall mean any plan of a debtor for the
settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts, upon any terms. " 115 The arrangement can be an extension,

107

Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. 502 (1970).
Bankruptcy Act§ 106(1), 11 u.s.c. § 506 (1970). See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i
9.06 n.2.
10
• Id. Bankruptcy Rule 10-401(b)(3)(A) requires that all holders of claims that are unliquidated, contingent or disputed file proofs of claim within a time prescribed in subsection
(b)(l) of the rule. Failure to do so disqualifies the creditor from participation in voting or
distribution of the proceeds. Under§ 1%, if a party in interest objects to the allowance of a
claim, the court must "summarily determine" the claim's allowability. Bankruptcy Act §
196, 11 U .S.C. § 596 (1970). Holders of all claims are bound by the provisions of the plan,
irrespective of whether they have been disallowed. Bankruptcy Act§ 224(1), 11 U.S.C. §
642(1) (1970).
110
Bankruptcy Act§ 624, 11 U.S.C. § 624 (1970); see also Bankruptcy Act§ 228(1), 11
u.s.c. 628(1) (1970).
111
Bankruptcy Act § 228(1), 11 U .S.C. § 628(1) (1970).
112
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,I 9.06 n.19.
113
/d.; see H. 0LECK, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW 324 (1953); R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 938 (2d ed. 1949).
114
See note 92 supra.
115 Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
116 Bankruptcy Act§§ 357(1),
356, 351, 11 u.s.c. §§ 757(1), 756, 751 (1970). See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,I 7.05.
lOB
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in which debts owed by the debtor are paid later than originally agreed; a
composition, in which creditors receive less than the full amount of their
claims; or a combination of the two, in which different classes of creditors
may be affected differently . 116
Where the arrangement provides that creditors receive less than the full
amount of their claims, the rules in straight bankruptcy governing provability and allowability apply .117 In contrast, an arrangement that only
extends the time of payment but still provides for full payment covers all
unsecured claims, regardless of their provability under section 63 or their
allowability under section 57d.11 8
An arrangement will be confirmed by the court if it has been accepted
by a majority in number and amount of the creditors whose claims have
been proved and are affected by the arrangement. 119 The debtor is discharged from unsecured debts covered by the arrangement with the
important exception of the debts enumerated in section 17, as well as
those debts excepted or not affected by the plan. 120
3. The Proposed Act-H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 continue the general
pattern of the present reorganization provisions of Chapter X. 121 Instead
of being an alternative to liquidation, though, reorganization is the only
course open to a corporation that seeks a discharge. 122 The proposed Act
authorizes the court to accept a plan only if all claimants accept the plan
or will be compensated in an amount equal to or greater than the amount
they would have obtained in a liquidation of the debtor. 123 Moreover,
each class of claimants must accept the plan unless its claims or interests
are unimpaired under the plan. 124 Acceptance of a plan by a class is
deemed to have occurred if holders of claims aggregating at least twothirds in dollar amount and one-half in number of allowed claims have
accepted the plan. 125 If the plan is not accepted by each class of claimants

117
This includes the definition of "creditor" and "debts" in subsections 1(11) and (14).
Bankruptcy Act§§ 1(11), (14); II u.s.c. §§ 1(11), (14) (1970). See l COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 2.22. These provisions are made applicable by § 302. Bankruptcy Act § 302, 11
u.s.c. § 702 (1970).
118
Bankruptcy Act§ 307(2), 11 U.S.C. § 707(2) (1970). The Bankruptcy judge still retains
discretion to disallow claims. Bankruptcy Act § 336(2), II U .S.C. § 736(2) (1970). As in
straight bankruptcy, proceedings in other courts on claims "from which a discharge would
be a release" are stayed until a disposition of the petitions effected. Bankruptcy Act§ 11, 11
U.S.C. § 29 (1970); Bankruptcy Rule 404. Section 314 expressly recognizes the applicability
of§ 11. Bankruptcy Act§ 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970).
119
Bankruptcy Act§ 362(1), 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (1970). If the creditors have been divided
into classes, there must be a majority in each of the classes so divided.
120
Bankruptcy Act § 371, 11 U.S.C. § n1 (1970).
121
Chapter II of the proposed Acts is designated simply as "Reorganization" and
incorporates aspects of present Chapters IX, X, XI and XII.
122
Section 727(a) states that "[t]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge unless-(1) the
debtor is not an individual."
123
H.R. 8200 § l 129(a)(7); S. 2266 § ll30(a)(8).
124
Section ll29(a)(8). Section 1124 defines "claims or interests unimpaired under a
plan."
125 Section ll26(c). Where a "class of interests" is involved, the requirement that the
interests aggregated one-half in number is eliminated under § ll26(d). See § 1122, which
describes the classification of claims or interests. Under § l 126(g), "[a] class is deemed to
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whose claims or interests are impaired by the plan,1 26 it still may be
approved if two requirements are met. First, no unsecured claimant may
receive compensation in an amount greater than the allowed amount of
the claim. 127 Second, either creditor may receive compensation in an
amount less than the allowed amount of the claim unless he has agreed to
different treatment, or the plan must conform to what is approximately
the old "absolute priority" rule 128 that
the plan does not discriminate unfairly against such class, and
the holders of claims or interests of any class of claims or
interests, as the case may be, that is junior to such class will not
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claims
or interests any property .129
Section 103 applies the provisions eliminating provability and requiring
estimation of disputed or unliquidated claims in the liquidation chapters130 to Chapter 11 cases. 131 Section 1141(a) provides that the plan will
bind all creditors regardless of whether their claims have been impaired or
whether they have accepted the plan. 132 The section is expressly modified, however, by paragraph (d)(2), which excepts from discharge the
claims listed in section 523. 133
C. Wage Earner Plans
1. The Present Act-Chapter XIII of the present Act provides for plans
in the nature of arrangements for individual debtors whose principal
income is derived from wages, salary, or commissions. A wage earner
plan may deal with debts secured by personal property as well as unsecured debts, 134 and may establish a priority of payment between these
two classes of debts if the plan involves an extension. 135 Future wages
must be submitted to the court's control for the duration of the plan. 136

have rejected a plan if such plan provides that the claims or interests of such class do not
entitle the holders of such claims or interests to payment or compensation under the plan on
account of such claims or interests."
126 See H.R. 8200 § 1129(b)(2)(R)(i), (ii); S. 2266 § 1130(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
127
H.R. 8200 § J129(b)(2)(B)(iii); S. 2266 § 1130(c)(2)(b)(iii).
128
See note 104 supra.
129
H.R. 8200 § I 129(b)(2)(B)(iv); S. 2266 § I 130(c)(2)(B)(iv). It is important to note that, in
addition to these provisions regarding unsecured claims, the plan must also meet certain
standards for secured claims and equity securities. Sections I 129(b)(2)(A), (B).
130
See notes 58-69 and accompanying text supra.
131
Section 103 makes applicable the general provisions of Chapter I, 3 and 5 to cases
under Chapter 11. This section differs from the comparable section in the present act, which
applies Chapters I to VII to proceedings under reorganization only "insofar as they are not
inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of [Chapter X]." Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11
U.S.C. 502 (1970). It may be presumed, therefore, that a section in Chapter I, 3 or 5 will
apply in reorganization unless specifically excluded.
132
Section 114l(a).
133
Section 114l(d)(2).
134
Bankruptcy Act§ 646(1), (2), II U.S.C. § 1046(1), (2) (1970). Secured debts must be
dealt with "severally," whereas unsecured debts must be dealt with generally. Id.
13
• Bankruptcy Act § 646(3), II U.S.C. § 1046(3) (1970).
136
Bankruptcy Act § 646(4), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4) (1970).
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The wage earner plan must be accepted both by a majority in number and
dollar amount of the affected unsecured creditors holding claims that are
provable and allowable, and by all secured crditors whose claims are
affected. 137 The plan must also be approved by the court. 138
This Chapter incorporates by reference all provisions of Chapters I-VII
that are not inconsistent with it. 134 This incorporation, however, does not
extend to the definition of "claims" used in straight bankruptcy. In
addition, the concept of provability as it is used in section 63 is expressly
eliminated, and contingent and unliquidated claims may be proved. 140
Discharge occurs upon one of two events: First, the debtor may successfully comply with all provisions of the plan. 141 Alternatively, if after
three years the debtor has not completed all payments under the plan, he
may apply for a determination by the court that this failure was due to
circumstances beyond his control. 142 The discharge only affects debts
provided for by the plan and does not affect debts excepted from discharge under section 17 unless the creditor holding the excepted claim
accepted the plan. 143 If the debtor fails to make the payments required
under the plan and the court finds that the failure was not beyond the
debtor's control, the creditors retain their claims for the unpaid amount of
the original debt, regardless of whether they accepted the plan. 144
2. The Proposed Act-An individual1 45 may resort to Chapter 13 of the
proposed Acts only if he has a "regular income" 146 and owes at a date of
filing less than $100,000 ($50,000 in the Senate Bill) in "noncontingent,
liquidated, unsecured debts" and less than $500,000 ($200,000 in the
Senate bill) in "noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts." 147 The reference to "noncontingent, liquidated ... debts" apparently only limits the

Bankruptcy Act § 652(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1970).
The court must approve the plan ifit finds that the following conditions have been met:
(!) The provisions of this chapter have been complied with;
(2) it is for the best interest of the creditors and is feasible;
(3) the debtor has not been guilty of any of the acts of failed to perform any of the
duties which would be a bar to the discharge of the bankrupt; and
( 4) the proposal and its acceptance are in good faith and have not been made or
procured by any means, promises, or actions forbidden by this act.
Bankruptcy Act § 656, 11 U.S.C. 1056 (1970).
139 Bankruptcy Act § 602, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970).
140
Bankruptcy Act§ 606(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(1) (1970) defines "claims" to include those
uncertain in amount or liability. There is no distinction between plans by way of settlement
and plans by way of satisfaction in defining provability under Chapter XIII. 10 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ,r 22.02 n.7. If the plan is subsequently converted into a straight bankruptcy
proceeding, § 63 applies. Bankruptcy Act § 643, 11 U .S.C. § 1043 (1970).
141 Bankruptcy Act § 660, 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1970).
142 Bankruptcy Act § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970).
143 Bankruptcy Act §§ 660, 661, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1060, 1061 (1970).
144
10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,I 29.10.
145 All other entities are excluded. H.R. 8200 § 109(e); S. 2266 § 109(d).
146 Regular income is defined as income which is "sufficiently stable and regular to enable
such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title." H.R. 8200
§ 101(23); s. 2266 § 101(24).
147
H.R. 8200 § 109(e); S. 2266 § 109(d). Spouses may file as a single unit provided one
spouse is not a stock or commodity broker. For joint husband and wife filings the maximum
amounts of permissible claims continue to apply as if they were a single individual. Id.
137
138
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debts that may be considered in the qualification of the debtor for participation in a Chapter 13 plan, and does not affect the provability or allowability of the debts. The all-inclusive definition of claims in section 101
applies in all chapters unless there is a specific exclusion. 148 There appear
to be no such exclusions in Chapter 13, for it refers to the plan as
involving all claims without any reference to their possibly unliquidated
or contingent nature.
The plan must provide for control by a trustee of an amount of the
debtor's income sufficient for successful execution of the plan and payment of claims entitled to priority under the liquidation sections. 149 Unsecured claims may be divided into classes based on substantial similarity or
on amount, but each claim within a particular class must be accorded the
same treatment and there may not be unfair discrimination against any
class. 150 The rights of both secured and unsecured claimants may be
modified. 151
There is no longer a requirement that the unsecured creditors approve
the plan, although the value of the property to be distributed to each of
them must not be Jess than the amount each would have received under a
liquidation. 152 Approval by each of the secured creditors is no longer
necessary to confirmation of the plan, though it remains sufficient; 153
other sufficient conditions are surrender by the debtor to each secured
party of the property securing the claim or full satisfaction of each
secured claim. 154
After the debtor completes all payments required by a confirmed
plan, 155 the debtor is discharged of all debts provided for by the plan or
disallowed. 156 Excepted from the discharged debts are liabilities for willful and malicious injury to another "entity" 157 or to the property of
another. 158 If the debtor fails to complete the required payments, a
discharge may still be granted if the court finds that the failure was a result
of "circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable. " 159 This provision for discharge without full payment differs from
that of the present Act because it does not require that three years elapse

us Although the provisions in Chapter 13 of both the Senate and House bills cannot apply
to any other proceedings,§ 103(h), Chapters l, 3, and 5 apply to proceedings under Chapter
13. § 103(a) .
... Section 1322(a).
150
Section 1322.
151
Section 1322(b)(2). The Senate Bill prohibits modification of "claims wholly secured
by mortages on real property." S. 2266 § 1322(b)(2).
152
Section 1325(a)(4). Those creditors who do not accept the plan are nevertheless bound.
§ 1327(a).
153 Section 1325(a)(5)(A).
154
Section 1325(a)(5)(B), (C).
155 Section 1328(a).
156
As in the case of a liquidation, disallowance cannot occur merely because of the
unliquidated character of the claim and is permitted only in specific situations not related to
an otherwise enforceable tort claim. Sections 502, 1328.
·
157
Entity is defined to include any "person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United
States trustee." H.R. 8200 § 101(14); S. 2266 § 101(15).
158 Section 1328(a)(2).
159
Section 1328(b)(l).
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between confirmation of the plan and discharge. 160 The new Act does
require, however, that prior to discharge without full payment each unsecured creditor must receive payment equal to the amount he would have
under a Chapter 7 liquidation 161 and that the court must find modification
of the plan to be impracticable. 162 In the event that discharge without full
payment is granted, the entire array of claims excepted from discharge
under a Chapter 7 liquidation is also excepted. 163

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Provability

The most significant step taken in the area of tort claims by the drafters
of the proposed Act has been to assure the provability of all tort claims. In
assessing the effect of this change, it is important to note that the conflicting interests on the provability issue are held by the commercial creditors
and the turt claimants, while on the dischargeability issue the primary
conflict is between the tort claimants and the debtor . 164 By making a new
class of claims provable, and therefore eligible to share in the distributions, Congress will effectively decrease the pool of assets available for
the unsecured commercial claimants. On the other hand, by making a
claim nondischargeable the measure of the debtor's relief is lessened.
This distinction must be modified by noting that the present system links
provability with dischargeability, so that nonprovable claims automatically become nondischargeable. Also, to the extent that a claim is nondischargeable, the debtor wants the claimant to share in the distribution so
that the undischarged portion of the claim will be at the expense of the
other claimants. 165
The proposed provision reverses the present view that, with the exception of few specific tort claims, all tort claims are nonprovable. As was

160

See note 142 and accompanying text supra.
Section 1328(b)(2).
162
Section 1382(b)(3); but see § 1329.
163
Section 1328(c), § 523(a).
164
Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475, 478-9 (1969).
165
The present rules allow a debtor in bankruptcy to file a nondischargeable but provable
claim for wages or taxes to allow its diminution before the discharge. Bankruptcy Rule 303.
The drafters of the Rules stated their purpose in so doing as follows:
It is the policy of the Act that debtor's estates should be administered for the
benefit of creditors without respect to the dischargeability of their claims. After
their estates have been closed, however, discharged bankrupts may find themselves saddled with liabilities ... which remain unpaid because of the failure of
creditors holding nondischargeable claims to file proofs of claims and receive
distributions thereon. The result is that the bankrupt is deprived of an important
benefit of the Act without any fault or omission on his part and without any
objective of the Act being served thereby.
Bankruptcy Rule 303, Advisory Committee's Note. The rules allow the debtor or the trustee
to do this for all claims in a case in reorganization, relying upon the same rationale.
Bankruptcy Rule 13-303.
161
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suggested earlier, 166 one reason for this approach is historical: traditionally, bankruptcy has been viewed as concerned only with claims ex contractu, not ex Lege or ex delicto. 161 There has been a steady movement
away from this conception of bankruptcy, though, and the traditional
perspective should have little force in this area. 168 Moreover, in many
cases a tort claim is essentially a cost of doing business and is thus
indistinguishable in theory from commercial claims . 169 This similarity is
especially true with regard to quasi-contractual claims under the present
scheme; the admission of such claims is necessary to any distribution
scheme for purely commercial claims, but their admission makes it difficult to rationally explain the exclusion of simple tort claims from participation.170
Certain practical reasons also require that tort claims be given greater
recognition than they receive under the present Act. The relationship that
gives rise to a tort is often involuntary, whereas a contractual relationship
is by its nature voluntary. 171 In contrast to the tort claimant, who in most
cases has no previous contract with the tortfeasor, the commercial claimant generally has the opportunity to assess the likelihood that the debtor
will resort to liquidation procedures. Thus, the contractual claimant is
ordinarily better able to demand security, to obtain insurance or to demand that the debtor obtain insurance. 172 Also, an uncompensated tort
victim bears an extremely heavy burden in many cases, especially where
personal injuries are involved. 173 Finally, eliminating the concept of
provability will ameliorate the complexity of the present system. The
resulting simplified system should permit easier and less costly access to
the process for both the debtor and the claimant. 174
One argument against the new Act's approach is that allowing tort
claims not provable under the present Act will introduce disputed and

166

See notes 70-88 and accompanying text supra.
Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467 (1925); Schall v. Camors, 251 U.S. 239, 250 (1920);
WILLIAMS ON BANKRUPTCY 154; Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE
L.J. 475, 479 (1969). MacLachlan calls the exclusion of tort claims "an anachronism tracing
back to the old idea that bankruptcy is only for the traders." MACLACHLAN, supra note 30,
at 128. See generally Glenn, Basic Considerations in Tort Claims in Bankruptcy and
Reorganization, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 367 (1941).
168
Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475,479 (1969).
169
Id. at 479; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). This has long been recognized in railroad
reorganizations. See Bankruptcy Act § 77(n), 11 U .S.C. § 205(n) (1970).
110
MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at § 113.
171
Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (1969). See
Thompson v. Tulchin (In re Cartridge Television Inc.), 535 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976).
172
Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (1969).
173
See note 195 infra.
174
The National Bankruptcy Commission recognized that the present scheme has become
"encrusted with qualifications and exceptions and provisos over the years, until it is
intolerably complicated and is unjust." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (CCH ed. 1973). [Hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY
COMMISSION]. In revising the present Act, the Commission recognized that "the process
should be intellectually accessible. The substantive laws, procedural rules, and administrative practices should be simplified and clarified to permit broader debtor, creditor, and
167
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unliquidated claims into the bankruptcy process, causing unnecessary
delay to commercial claimants. 175 The possible delay caused by liquidating or estimating some tort claims should not cause a blanket exclusion of
all tort claims, however. Moreover, for those claims that would cause an
undue delay, it is undoubtedly more equitable to have the bankruptcy
court estimate it for inclusion in the distribution, as the proposed act
specifies, 176 than to exclude the claim entirely from distribution. Another
objection to proof of tort claims is that the debtor should be punished by
being forced to pay damages, not the creditors. 177 The reply to this
argument is that most tort awards are compensatory, not punitive.17 8
A third argument against the liberal provability of tort claims pertains to
the debtor's duty to list all potential claimants. A listing of all potential
tort claims may cause the filing of claims that would otherwise be allowed
to lapse. It is feared that the debtor's act of listing the claim may constitute an admission ofliability. This reasoning, however, applies equally to
commercial claims. Keeping tort claims from being proved unless and
until sued upon unjustifiably deters the filing of petitions in bankruptcy by
tortfeasors until a suit is filed .1 79
B. Dischargeability

The issue of whether tort claims ought to be dischargeable is closely
related to the issue of whether they ought to be provable. Indeed, under
the present system a nonprovable claim is nondischargeable. 18 ° Consequently, leaving tort claims nonprovable may appear to be the best
alternative because it allows the injured party to recover against the
debtor after bankruptcy.
Survival of the claim after discharge will be useful to the claimant only
if the debtor is later rehabilitated. Although there has been no systematic
study of the frequency of complete financial recovery, the vast majority
of individual bankrupts have post-bankruptcy incomes that are below

counselor participation." Id. at 88. See also id. at 91.
175 One Circuit Court, in justifying a discretionary disallowance of a tort claim under §
57d, stated that allowing all tort claims would
run counter to the purpose of the Act, which is to promote the prompt liquidation of
each debtor's estate and the expeditious distribution of the proceeds to the bona
fide general creditors holding provable claims so that they will not be forced to wait
unduly long for payments due them.
Thompson v. Tulchin (In re Cartridge Television Inc.), 535 F.2d 1388, 1390 (2d Cir. 1976).
1 76
Section 502(c); see § 502(b).
177 Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (1969). The
general policy of the present Act is not to inflict penalties incurred by the bankrupt upon the
bankrupt's creditors. See § 57(j) (disallowing governmental penalties beyond pecuniary loss
and interest).
178 Note, Tort Claims and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (1969).
Punitive and exemplary damages present a different case, of course.
179 MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at 138. Conversely, the claimant wishing to have a
nondischargeable claim will be motivated to convince creditors with provable claims to start
an involuntary proceeding before they start suit. Id.
180
See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
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average, 181 suggesting that the discharged individual debtor may be unable to satisfy a large tort claim. While some chance of post-bankruptcy
recovery exists against individual debtors, there is no possibility of postbankruptcy recourse to the assets of a corporation. The discharged corporation effectively disappears as a source of payment at the end of the
bankruptcy case, and most corporations do not even seek a discharge. 182
Even though an adjudication in bankruptcy does not terminate the corporate entity, 183 all that remains after bankruptcy is a shell without assets .184
In addition to providing the tort claimant with little effective relief, the
nondischargeability of tort claims can have a devastating effect on the
likelihood of the debtor receiving a "fresh start. " 185 Originally, the primary purpose of the bankruptcy law was to provide equal treatment for all
creditors of the same class, 186 but there has been increasing emphasis on
the objective of relieving "the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. " 187 Where a

181
In 1965, 99 percent of a sampling of fonner bankrupts reported that their annual
post-bankruptcy income was below $15,000. Ninety-three percent reported that their income was below $10,000. Eighty-four percent were below $8,000 and 61 percent were below
$6,000. BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 44.
182
Before the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Rules (see Bankruptcy Rule 404) a corporation had to apply for a discharge even though an individual was granted one automatically.
A mere 2.5 percent of corporate bankrupts took this additional step and those who did were
never opposed. BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 128.
183
In re Russell Wheel & Foundry Co., 222 F. 569 (E.D. Mich. 1915); Morley v. Thayer, 3
F. 737 (C.C.D. Mass 1880).
184
Professor Schuchman summarizes the normal situation in the following way:
In theory, the discharge from personal liability is not necessary for persons engaged in business in the usual corporate fonn. In order to promote commerce and
the necessary accumulation of capital for business enterprises, other laws limit the
liability of such persons to their capital investment and what business assets that
investment has produced. Although the capital and assets are lost in a business
bankruptcy, the individual entrepreneurs are not ordinarily liable for unpaid debts,
i.e., adjusted claims. As individuals, .they may retain their personally held property, and, as entrepreneurs, they may again attempt success in business enterprises, the bankruptcy having been but an unhappy chapter.
Schuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403, 421
(1973). See BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 114-15. This has even been recognized by the
House of Representatives. "Although a corporate bankrupt is theoretically not discharged,
the corporation normally ceases to exist upon bankruptcy and ... unsatisfied claims are
without further recourse .... " H.R. REP. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). One court
considered and rejected the argument that disallowance pursuant to § 57d of unliquidated
claims is an abuse of discretion where a bankrupt corporation is involved because the claims
are, in effect, discharged without any possibility of satisfaction. Thompson v. Tulchin (In re
Cartridge Television Inc.), 535 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976).
185
See generally BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 128. Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427 (1974).
See also 8 w. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 243 (1926); In re Shawsheen Dairy
47 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Mass. 1942).
186
BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 10.
187
Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). See also Local
Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The shift in attitudes from concern for creditors'
rights to concern for debtor's rights may be illustrated by observing that the earliest laws did
not provide for discharge of the bankrupt's debts. BROOKINGS. supra note 4, at 10. Within
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discharge is necessary the debtor is clearly in no position to assume a
large, undischarged debt. 188
The eagerness to free the debtor from "the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt" 189 should be tempered, though, by a consideration of the purposes behind the fresh start concept. At least one of the
reasons for this approach to bankruptcy is loss allocation: the burden of
the debt should be placed on the party best al1le to pay, and the creditor is
generally better able to pass a commercial loss along to his other customers .190 With normal commercial claims, only a very small increase in the
cost of credit to other debtors is necessary to compensate for the loss. 191
Moreover, failure to release debtors from debts which they cannot pay
could result in a constriction of the credit markets by inhibiting the
entrance of marginal borrowers. 192 The same reasoning may not apply,
however, to a noncommercial obligation such as a tort claim. This kind of
claim differs from a commercial claim in that it is not normally voluntary, 193 the incidence of the loss is not easily transferred from the tort

the present Act, the section on exemptions provides clear recognition of the need to provide
the debtor with a fresh start. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U .S.C. § 24 (1970). This recognition is
continued in § 522 of the proposed Acts. See BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 15. The continued
validity of the principles enunciated in Local Loan can be seen in such recent cases as Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) and Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970). The movement
toward more complete relief may actually be accelerating. See IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 17.17; BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 16. The reference to
"business" misfortunes has become less important as the courts have applied the fresh start
concept to nonbusiness bankruptcies. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1973).
188 The Court in Local Loan also said
[t]he new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the
purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little
value to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the necessity of devoting the
whole or a considerable portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to
the payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy.
Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934). See Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427 (1974).
189 Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
190
See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 90.
191
See Schuchman & Jantscher, Correlation of Bad Debt Losses and Nonbusiness
Bankruptcy Rates, 77 CoM. L.J. 358 (1972). The Brookings Study reported that
[s]ome $2 billion of debt were discharged in the bankruptcy courts in 1968-about
.2 percent of the private debt outstanding-a cost that is widely diffused throughout
the economy being borne partly by borrowers as a whole, through higher interest
rates, but principally by customers of business borrowers, through higher prices.
BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 40.
192 Encouragement of credit is often mentioned as an important goal of the bankruptcy
process. BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 39; Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 436-37 (1974);
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 81-87. The Brookings Study indicates that the
sharp increase in bankruptcies since World War II "apparently resulted from the increase in
the amount of indebtedness of the population rather than from deteriorating credit standards
or a greater willingness of persons to enter bankruptcy.'' BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 42.
The absence of such a bad debt loss could very well indicate that the commercial credit
system is not functioning optimally and that no marginal borrowers are receiving credit. Id.
at 39.
193 See notes 171-72 and accompanying text supra. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1977). Because of their involuntary nature, there is no possibility of arguing that,
by engaging in a commercial transaction with the debtor, the tort claimant has considered
and made arrangements for the possibility of bankruptcy.
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victim to a broader class, 194 and the burden of loss is likely to be much
heavier. 195 Consequently, the allocative effect of the bankruptcy process
may differ according to the kind of claim under consideration. 196 As a
result, it may be desirable to resolve the dischargeability issue by engaging in a balancing process to decide who should bear the burden. 197 With
regard to tort claims, this requires balancing the debtor's interest in
obtaining a fresh start against the societal interest in spreading out the tort
victim's loss.
This balancing approach to the dischargeability of tort claims may
require consideration of other factors beside the allocative effects. For
example, feelings that intentional, and, to a lesser extent, negligent tortfeasors are morally culpable may require nondischargeability . 198 Some
intentional tortfeasors may be inhibited by the realization that they will
not be discharged in bankruptcy. There may also be a lingering fear that
making tort claims dischargeable will increase the likelihood that
tortfeasors will use the threat of bankruptcy to force settlements, although the empirical evidence does not support this fear. 199 All of these
beliefs are clearly open to question, however, and even if indisputably
true, they would probably not be sufficient to require a complete exception of these torts from dischargeability.
In sum, the competing considerations involved in deciding whether a
particular class of torts ought to be discharged are more closely balanced
than those involved in deciding whether they ought to be provable. A
decision that. is just in one situation may be unjust in another. 200 If the
194
The tort claimant may not even be able to recover from the bankrupt's insurer if the
insurance policy held by the debtor will reimburse only those claims actually paid by the
insured party. W. VANCE, INSURANCE § 135 (3d ed. 1951). A number of courts have
prohibited this form of insurance, id., but it is still unclear that an individual or business in
enough financial difficulty to require resort to bankruptcy will have had the foresight or
incentive to devote limited assets to the payment of insurance premiums. Note, Tort Cluims
and the Bankrupt Corporation, 78 YALE L.J. 475 (1969). Further, insurance against willful
and malicious tort claims is unlikely. Id. at 478.
195
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 81, 83, 90.
196
Id. at 89.
197
The Bankruptcy Commission suggested that "[e]ach creditor's net burden should be
weighed against the burden of excepting the debt from discharge." Id. at 90. Tax claims, by
contrast, are nondischargeable in spite of the fact that the taxing authority, as a "single
holder of a larger number of claims, . . . is unlikely to be affected substantially by the
bankruptcy process because only a minute percentage of almost any population of debtors
obtain relief under the Act." Id.
198

Claims arising from conduct of the debtor egregiously violating community standards, such as claims for fraud, larceny, embezzlement, willful and malicious
wrongs, and civil penalties, should not be discharged because social policy directs,
impliedly at least, that the debtor should not be able to escape his responsibility
through the bankruptcy process.
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, supra note 174, at 91.
199
Fifty-one percent of a group of plaintiffs' lawyers interviewed by the authors of the
Brookings Study reported that they had never settled a case because of a threat of bankruptcy by the defendant; twenty-eight percent had made such a settlement in one to five
percent of their cases, and twenty-one percent had settled for this reason in greater than five
percent of their cases. BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 49. It is interesting to note that neither
plaintiffs nor defendants perceived tort judgments as being a significant cause of bankruptcy. Id.
200
See MACLACHLAN, supra note 30, at § 138.
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balance tilts in either direction, however, it tilts toward the discharge of
all torts. 201 While it may appear to allow a "willful and malicious"
tortfeasor to escape with impunity, it is unlikely that the debtor will be
able to accumulate assets sufficient to satisfy a major tort claim. It may be
no less abhorent to burden a person with a debt he cannot hope to pay. 202
If the debtor's financial difficulties are great enough to require resolution
in a court of bankruptcy, it serves little purpose'to begrudge a discharge of
the tort claim.
C. Priority

Although the new law will extend priority to at least one class of
commercial claims previously unrecognized, 203 no effort is made to grant
priority to tort claims. The purpose of the priority sections is to prefer
certain categories of claims that are more important or more deserving of
payment than others. 204 Consequently, many of the same considerations
which apply in determining whether a debt ought to be dischargeable or
not also apply here. 205
Several justifications have been advanced for the existing scheme of
priorities. The administrative expense priority has been supported for a
purely practical reason: without it the system could not operate. 206 One
commentator supports the tax priority because it involves an involuntary
transaction for which the government cannot demand security, and increases the government's ~ready serious financial difficulties. 207 This
rationale is also adopted in the House Committee Report. 208 Stanley and
Girth criticize the tax priority on the ground that it has only a very small
effect on the federal budget. 209 In fact, they recommend retaining only the

201
202

See BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 208.
Daniel Webster described the debtor with nondischargeable debts in the following

way:
[H]owever good his intentions or earnest his endavors, it subdues his spirit, and
degrades him in his own esteem; and if he attempts any thing for the purpose of
obtaining food and clothing for his family, he is driven to unworthy shifts and
disguises, to the use of other persons' names, to the adoption of the character of
agent, and various other contrivances, to keep the little earnings of the day from
the reach of his creditors.
Reprinted in Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The
Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 427, 440 (1974). Justice Sutherland observed that,
"[f]rom the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference between not earning at all
and earning wholly for a creditor." Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
203
See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
20 • Stone, A Primer on Bankruptcy, 16 TULANE L. REv. 339, 357(1942); M. COHEN,
REASON & NATURE 416 (1931); Schuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy of Bankruptcy, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403, 446 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1977).
205
Taxes and wages are effectively given both priority and nondischargeable status.
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(l), (5), 11 U .S.C. § 35(a)(I), (5) (1970).
206
Shanker, The Worthier Creditors (And a Cheer for the King), I CAN. Bus. L.J. 340, 341
(1976). See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
207
Id. at 344-46.
208
The government "cannot choose its debtors, nor can it take security in advance of the
time that taxes become due." H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1977).
20
• BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 131.
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priority for wage earners, which they feel is needed to protect employees
who are essentially unable to gauge the possibility that their employer will
go bankrupt. 210
The basic justifications for priorities underlying the views of each of
these commentators are never explicitly stated, although the House
Committee does refer broadly to the goal of protecting people in situations
involving "special circumstances or special need." 211 Professor
Schuchman states a somewhat more refined test: "Presumably, one
would look to the need and deserts of the creditors and the moral worthiness of the debt. " 212 Professor Shanker argues that the priorities should
protect creditors who "(l) did not choose to deal with or extend credit to
the bankrupt, (2) did not intend to take the risk of his insolvency, (3) had
no advantage or profit to gain from becoming a creditor of the bankrupt,
and (4) had no way of insisting upon cash or security before the debt was
incurred. " 213 Stanley and Girth would probably add inability to obtain
information enabling the claimant to calculate the likelihood of bankruptcy. 214
Tort claims meet these criteria squarely: 215 the relationship is involuntary, no profit motive exists, and the victim certainly has no way of
insisting on security. Moreover, giving tort claims priority would give the
claimant a greater chance of being paid without impairing the debtor's
fresh start.
By increasing the priority of tort claimants the return on commercial
claims would be correspondingly decreased. If this resulted in a significant decrease in the return on commercial loans, the cost of credit would
increase. The result would be a kind of bankruptcy insurance borne by
credit users. Though this cost would apply to some degree to the entire
borrowing community, borrowers who presented a greater risk of bankruptcy because of a poor financial position would clearly bear a greater
proportion of the cost. In contrast, tortfeasors would be likely to come
from all classes of debtors, and commercial creditors could distribute
their anticipated losses due to bankruptcies caused by tort claims more
evenly among the entire population. Unfortunately, it is still the higher
risk debtors who are more likely to react to a tort claim of any significant
size by seeking a discharge in bankruptcy so that the incidence of the
increased cost might still fall on lower income debtors. 216

Id.
H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1977).
Schuchman, An Attempt at a Philosophy ofBankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403, 446
(1973).
213
Shanker, The Worthier Creditors (And a Cheer for the King), I CAN. Bus. L.J. 340, 349
(1976).
214
BROOKINGS, supra note 4, at 209.
215
Id.at 349-50.
216
BROOKINGS. supra note 4, at 10.
210
2
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212
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CONCLUSION

The present Bankruptcy Act allows tort claims only a limited share in
the distribution of the estate in bankruptcy. Their participation depends
on the nature of the claim, whether suit has been brought against the
tortfeasor, and the form ofreliefwhich is sought by the debtor. If the tort
claimant is not allowed to prove his claim in the bankruptcy court, he may
be able to pursue the debtor after the discharge, and some forms of tort
claims survive even for tort claimants who share in the distribution.
The proposed Act admits almost all tort claims into the bankruptcy
process, but retains many of the provisions regarding the nondischargeability of certain types of tort claims. This expansion of the tort claimant's
right to participate in the distribution of the proceeds aids both the debtor
and the tort claimant and simplifies a procedure which is now overly
complex. By continuing to limit the dischargeability of tort claims,
though, the proposed Act diminishes the debtor's fresh start, without
significantly increasing the probability that the claimant will eventually be
paid. The tort claimant could receive the same protection provided by the
dischargeability provisions if he were granted priority over commercial
creditors. This would have the additional benefit of not impairing the
debtor's fresh start.
-Stephen Allen Edwards

